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A MULTI-LAYER APPROACH FOR DETECTION OF 
SELECTIVE FORWARDING ATTACKS IN WIRELESS 
SENSOR NETWORKS 
ABSTRACT 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are increasingly used due to their broad range 
of important applications in both military and civilian domains. Security is a major 
threat in WSNs. WSNs are prone to several types of security attacks. Sensor nodes have 
limited capacities and are deployed in dangerous locations; therefore, they are 
vulnerable to different types of attacks, including wormhole, sinkhole, and selective 
forwarding attacks. Security attacks are classified as data traffic and routing attacks. 
These security attacks could affect the most significant applications of WSNs, namely, 
military surveillance, traffic monitoring, and healthcare. Therefore, many approaches 
were suggested in literature to detect security attacks on the network layer in WSNs. 
The network layer is of paramount significance to the security of WSNs to 
prevent exploitation of their confidentiality, privacy, availability, integrity, and 
authenticity. Reliability, energy efficiency, and scalability are strong constraints on 
sensor nodes that affect the security of WSNs. Because sensor nodes have limited 
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capabilities in most of these areas, selective forwarding attacks cannot be easily 
detected in networks.  
In this dissertation, an approach to selective forwarding detection (SFD) is 
suggested. The approach has three layers: MAC pool IDs, rule-based processing, and 
anomaly detection. It maintains the safety of data transmission between a source node 
and base station while detecting selective forwarding attacks. Furthermore, the approach 
is reliable, energy efficient, and scalable. 
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CHAPTER 1: INRTODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks contain numerous sensors. These sensors 
communicate with a vast number of small nodes via radio links. Sensor networks have a 
source and a base station. The base station controls the sensor networks. They have the 
ability to collect sensor data and send it to the base station. All data flows between the 
nodes and the ends at the base station. Nodes are densely deployed [1]. The positions of 
the nodes do not need to be predetermined. Sensor nodes are deployed in high-risk 
areas. The majority of WSN protocols do not have the security to prevent simple attacks 
on the nodes [2]. 
The security of wireless sensor networks has been extensively investigated over 
the past few years. WSNs are susceptible to many types of attacks because they serve as 
an open network with limited resources of nodes. Therefore, the obstacles to securing a 
wireless sensor network comprise the main disadvantage for all devices. The sensor 
networks vulnerable to different types of security threats from attackers at most layers 
of the networks. The most conventional threats to the security of wireless sensor 
networks include eavesdropping, node compromised, interrupt, modify or inject 
malicious packets, compromised privacy and denial of service attacks [3]. Sensor node 
can be simply compromised in contrast with wired networks. A common attack in a 
WSN is a DoS attack; the primary objective of the attacker in a DoS attack is to make 
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WSNs unavailable for users [4]. In a DoS attack, the energy efficient protocols serve as 
targets in wireless sensor networks. Sensor nodes are liable to physical capture. Because 
the use of a sensor node as a target is inexpensive, tamper-resistant hardware is unlikely 
to take over. The denial of a service attack can be affected by draining the energy of 
sensor nodes to prevent sensor nodes from receiving authentic messages. Even with 
physical damage to sensor nodes, which have rendered a network inaccessible, the goal 
of the attacks is to disrupt the network during the transfer of data [5]. The majority of 
studies about WSNs can be classified as follows [6]: 
• Key Management: Establishing and maintaining cryptographic keys in an 
energy efficient manner to enable encryption and authentication. 
• Secure Routing: Discovering new protection techniques and applying them to 
new routing protocols without sacrificing network connectivity, coverage or 
scalability. 
• Secure Services: Includes specialized security services such as data 
aggregation, localization and time synchronization. 
Wireless sensor networks are emerging as a central new stage in the information 
technology ecosystem and an area of active research involving hardware and system 
design networking, distributed algorithms, programming models, data management, 
security and social factors [7], [8]. Wireless sensor networks are widely employed in the 
area that would insure a specific task. 
Network layer is subjected many routing protocols for instance, Flat routing, and 
hierarchal routing. The simple function of the routing protocol is to find the reliability 
path. Data aggregation is used in flat routing. It a set of automated methods combining 
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the data that comes from sensor nodes into a set of relevant information and exclude the 
duplication [4]. LEACH is a popular hierarchy routing protocol [5]. It separates the 
network into clusters and randomly and selects the cluster head to do the routing 
function from cluster to the base station. A network layer in WSNs is subjected to many 
types of attacks. Furthermore, a sensor node may acquire advantages of multi-hop by 
simply refusing to route packets. Therefore, it could be executed all the time with the 
net result. 
 
Figure 1: Sensor Architecture 
1.1. Research Problem and Scope 
A sensor node is a small, lightweight sensing device. It is composed of a 
constrained processing unit and small amount of memory for its small operating system 
as shown in Figure1. Additionally, a sensor node includes a limited-range transceiver 
and a battery unit [1]. It also includes a mobility subsystem. WSNs manage thousands 
of sensor nodes. In fact, these sensor nodes communicate with a huge number of small 
nodes via radio links. Sensor nodes in a network gather data that are necessary to 
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include in a smart network environment. These environments include homes, 
transportation systems, military installations, healthcare systems, and buildings.  
Network layer is the important layer in the networks and prone many types of 
security attacks. The most attacks in sensor network routing are spoofing, selective 
forwarding, sinkhole, Sybil attack, wormhole attack, node replication attack, flooding 
and attack against privacy. While the communication between sensor nodes in WSNs is 
accomplished wirelessly by radio, adversaries can use many types of those attacks. 
Eavesdropping, compromising nodes, interrupting or modifying packets, and injecting 
malicious packets compromise privacy are threats to the security of WSNs [2]. 
Therefore, attackers compromise the internal sensor nodes from which they launch 
attacks, which are difficult to detect.  
Sensor networks are vulnerable to many types of security attack. A malicious 
node tries to create blocks that occur while messages are being transferred between 
sensor nodes in the network by, for instance, forwarding a message along another path, 
generating an inaccurate network route, and delaying the transfer of packets between 
nodes. In a sensor network area, data are sent to the base station through routers. An 
attacker compromises the nodes by attacking the network resources. A selective 
forwarding attack is the one of major attacks in WSNs. It is an attack where a node send 
some of messages to other nodes or base station whilst drop the sensitive information. 
The adversary installs a malicious node in the network area, which drops packets. Once 
the malicious node is present in the network, it organizes routing loops that attract or 
refuse network traffic. In addition, malicious node can do some activities that impact to 
the network. These activities are such as extend or shorten source routers, generate false 
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messages, and attempt to drop significant messages. Packets that are dropped 
selectively sometime come from one node or a group of nodes. Therefore, a malicious 
node refuses to forward the packets. Moreover, the base station does not receive the 
entire message. The problem is selective forwarding attacks in network. The constraints 
such as reliability, energy efficient, and scalability in WSNs are challenging factors to 
solve. The state-of-art research in this area focuses on selective forwarding detection, 
reliability, energy efficient, and scalability. 
1.2. Motivation behind the Research 
The features of sensor nodes guarantee many applications. Therefore, 
applications comprise several levels of monitoring, tracking, and controlling. A group 
of applications is employed for specific purposes. In military applications, sensor nodes 
include military base, battlefield surveillance and object tracking. The military base 
surveillance utilized in military operations have prompted the development of WSNs. In 
medical applications, sensors aid in patient diagnosis and monitoring. The majority of 
these applications are deployed to monitor an area and react when a sensitive factor is 
recorded. The motives are to build a new paradigm for detecting selective forwarding 
attacks, extend the network lifetime by reduce the energy consumption, and the 
applications need to be reliable and scalable. 
1.3. Potential Contribution of the Proposed Research 
In this proposal, we introduce a novel data and detection protocol. The 
protocol’s name is Selective Forwarding Detection (SFD), which contains of three 
multi-layers. Multi-layers framework provides longer secure surveillance for military 
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base, reliable path from the sender node to the base station, extends network’s lifetime 
by reducing the energy efficient, and staying at least at the same level as the network 
increases larger, which is impacted to the scalable. These features enhance the 
network’s lifetime and improve the QoS. We designed three layers including MAC pool 
IDs layer, rule-based processing layer, and anomaly detection layer. They maintain the 
safety of data transmission between a source node and base station while detecting 
selective forwarding attacks. Furthermore. We demonstrate the performance of the 
protocol by creating a military base scenario. It is simulated using Network Simulation-
2 NS2. There are some assumptions to detect the selective forwarding attack within 
certain applications. We assume that all nodes are the same specification. All nodes in 
the network are having the same energy at starting point and having maximum energy. 
As well as, we assume that nodes are uniformly distributed in network in a random 
manner. Malicious nodes should not drop any packets before launching a selective 
forwarding attack, and an adversary cannot attack nodes during their deployment. 
Nodes can send data to Base station. Received Signal Strength Indicator-RSSI is the 
mechanism to measure the distance between the base station and node. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY FOR SECURITY 
ATTACKS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWROKS 
Wireless sensor networks are very weak and susceptible to many types of 
security attacks on the broadcast. Security attacks are classified into two classes: 
passive attacks and active attacks [9]. In passive attacks, the attacker compromises data 
confidentiality. In active attacks, the malicious action targets data confidentiality, data 
integrity, and unauthorized access. In WSNs, attacks occur in two forms based on the 
type of hardware utilized by the attacker to compromise the network [2]: mote class 
attackers and laptop class attackers. Mote class attackers have access to some sensor 
nodes, such as regular sensor nodes. Malicious nodes are usually gained during node-
compromised activities. Laptop class attackers have access to more powerful devices, 
such as laptops, smart phones, and workstations. The attacks can be classified into two 
types of attacks: outsider attacks and insider attacks. In an outsider attack, the adversary 
cannot gain any type of access to the network communications but the network must be 
pervaded before the attack can be detected. In an insider attack, the adversary gains 
legitimate and authorized access to the network by neighboring nodes. 
A DoS attack is one of the security attacks that impacts wireless sensor 
networks. It is dependent on the vulnerability of each layer. A DoS attack is a 
multilayer attack that can launch from any layer in the network. Different types of DoS 
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attacks can impact sensor nodes and can also affect idle nodes or standby mode. A DoS 
attack comprises the main energy consumption attack in WSNs. Thus, its main focus is 
network resources. It can also disrupt wireless transmission and can occur either 
unintentionally in the form of interference, noise or collision at the receiver side or at in 
the context of an attack [3]. Attackers must reach certain targets, such as network 
access, network infrastructure, and server applications. The DoS attack attempts to drain 
the resources available to the victim node by transferring unnecessary data. Therefore, it 
prevents users from accessing services. This type of attack is intended not only for 
adversaries who wish to subvert, disrupt, or destroy a network but also for any event 
that diminishes a network’s capability to provide a service [10]. Thus, a DoS attack 
renders a service unavailable for the users. Several types of attacks to the networks 
exist, such as consumption of bandwidth or processor time, disruption of service to a 
system or user, and disruption of physical components. 
Karlof [2] noted the names of some types of DoS attacks, such as spoofed data, 
selective forwarding, the sinkhole attack, the Sybil attack, the wormholes attack, the 
hello flood attack, and acknowledgment spoofing. Therefore, DoS attacks are severe 
impacts on most layers of sensor networks. Because a DoS attack comprises a 
dangerous threat to a wireless sensor network, studies have explored various 
mechanisms to detect these types of attacks. The important aspect of a DoS attack is the 
identification of the nodes that are harmed by the adversary.  
There are some methods to prevent DoS attacks such as payment for network 
resources, pushback, strong authentication and identification of traffic [10]. Some 
mechanism can be implemented to safeguard the reprogramming process, for example, 
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authentication flows. The choice for a DoS attack is the recreate the key request packet, 
which is came from the sensor node while the lifetime of the keys has expired. If the 
rate of recreate the key requests is frequently, the sink can conclude the occurrence of a 
DoS attack and drop the packet from the node for a configurable period of time [11].  
Karlof and Wagner [2] have proposed a design for sensor network security and 
presented different types of threats in ad hoc networks that may reverse the sensor 
security. Arazi, Qi, and Rose have proposed a RSA based on a framework to prevent 
DoS attacks and ensure that malicious nodes exhaust the resources [12]. Advancements 
in wireless sensor networks are being achieved in several fields. Therefore, security in 
WSNs is an active research field [13]. 
Figure 2 provides denial of service for several types of attacks at different 
layers. At the physical layer, a DoS attack may cause jamming and tampering. At the 
network layer, it may cause black holes, spoofing, replying, and homing. At the link 
layer, it may cause collisions and unfairness. At the transport layer, it may cause 
flooding and de-synchronization [14]. 
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of Security Attacks 
2.1. Physical Layer 
The physical layer is responsible for the establishment of certain functions, such 
as connection, modulation, data rate, data encryption, and signal detection. In addition, a 
physical layer in a network may increase the reliability by reducing the path loss effect 
and shadowing. Attacks that affect the physical layer include jamming and tampering. 
2.1.1. Jamming  
Jamming is a type of DoS attack in the physical layer. Because the physical 
layer is responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency generation, signal 
detection, and data encryption and is the lowest layer, it is the first layer to be attacked 
via jammers [15]. Malicious nodes use the same frequency in the network. Therefore, 
jamming the entire network will damage the network. An attacker attempts to transfer 
many packets in different paths to jam the networks. In addition, limited resources lure 
the adversaries to attack networks. 
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2.1.2. Tampering 
Tampering involves circuitry or injecting fabricated code in a legitimate node. 
The intruder captures the node by changing its programming code. Thus, attackers may 
attempt to acquire sensitive information, such as the cryptography key from a node, by 
destroying it to gain access to a higher level of communication [16]. It affects the 
physical layer when the sensor nodes are unattended after deployment. 
2.2. Data Link Layer 
The guarantee interoperability communication between sensor nodes is the main 
objective of the data link layer. It is responsible for error detection, multiplexing, 
prevention of collision of packets and transmission. The data link layer impacts security 
attacks as follows: 
2.2.1. Collision   
A collision attack executes between two nodes during transmission in a channel. 
It occurs when the two nodes attempt to transmit using the same frequency. It affects all 
transmitted packets. The error correction code can be employed to protect the link layer 
from this type of attack [17]. 
2.2.2. Medium Access Control (MAC) 
MAC layer protocols are designed for wireless sensor networks. A MAC 
protocol employs different algorithms to conserve battery power [18]. Using low power 
modes for a radio conserves the battery power when sending or receiving data. The 
main attack in a MAC protocol is the denial of sleep attacks. The denial of sleep attacks 
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is against the S-MAC protocol [19], which employ a static cycle. Sensor nodes in this 
protocol are organized into virtual clusters using SYNC messages. Using this protocol, 
radio networks will be asleep 90% of the time. The T-MAC protocol [20] is superior to 
the S-MAC protocol by focusing all traffic at the beginning of the period. Because it 
used the same SYNC technique, the technique enables nodes to transition to sleep 
mode. B-MAC [21] used a technique that is referred to as low-power listening (LPL). 
This technique is used to reduce energy consumption. G-MAC [22] is an energy 
efficient MAC protocol that is designed to coordinate transmissions in clusters. 
2.3. Transport Layer 
The main objective of the transport layer is to provide reliability and congestion. 
Many protocols are designed to provide these two tasks. However, they employ 
different techniques. 
2.3.1. Flooding 
Flooding attack is a problem that impacts the transport layer. The attacker 
establishes a connection request until resources are drained. Connection via a puzzle is a 
potential solution [16]. 
2.3.2. De-Synchronization Attack 
De-synchronization is another attack in the transport layer. This attack occurs 
when there is connection between two endpoints. Therefore, the adversary creates 
inaccurate messages at the endpoints [16]. 
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2.4. Application Layer 
Collection, management and processing of the data are the main functions of the 
application layer. The objective of the application layer is to render the final output. 
Therefore, it ensures that the information flows to lower layers. The application layer 
consists of user data and supports many protocols, such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and 
TELNET, which provides vulnerability to attacks. The major attack in the application 
layer is an attack on reliability and data aggregation distortion. The adversary in this 
attack needs to determine the communication route to alter data using that route. In 
addition, the adversary creates faulty data via network connections. Therefore, sensor 
nodes will be harmed by the energy consumption attack when responding to the false 
data. Ensuring reliability acknowledgment for all received data is the main task of 
security to prevent attacks on reliability [23]. 
2.5. Network Layer 
The goal of the network layer is to establish a path for efficient routing 
techniques. Therefore, the main function in the network layer is routing. The network 
layer is also responsible for some network tasks, such as routing the data between 
nodes, routing the data from a node to the base station, and routing data between a node 
and a cluster head. Several challenges at the network layer exist based on applications. 
These challenges include limited memory, efficiency, reliability, scalability, and energy 
consumption [24]. The attack of the network layer from several types of attacks impacts 
these challenges. Routing in the network layer may have caused one of these attacks. 
Consequently, most network layer attacks against sensor networks may be categorized 
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as one of the following attacks: spoofing or replaying information, selective forwarding, 
the sinkhole attack, the Sybil attack, and the wormhole attack. 
2.5.1. Spoofing or Replaying Information 
This type of attack directly impacts routing information. Creating routing loops, 
extending or shortening service routes, generating false error messages, and increasing 
end-to-end latency are caused by the spoofing attack [2]. 
2.5.2. Sinkhole Attack 
One of the DoS attacks types is sinkhole attack. Sinkhole attack is a significant 
attack. It makes the base station to acquire the whole data and thus create a severe major 
threat to layer application. Sinkhole attack comprises one type of network layer attack. 
In addition, a compromised node sends false routing information to its neighbors to 
attract network traffic to itself [25]. In a sinkhole attack, the attacker’s objective is to 
tempt the majority of the traffic from a specific location in the network via a 
compromised node, which generates a metaphorical sinkhole with the attacker at the 
center [2]. For example, when the node at the coordinator is attacked from an adversary, 
all other nodes follow it into the sinkhole.    
The major chance in a sinkhole attack is eavesdropping. A compromised sensor 
node attempts to impact the information sent to it from any neighboring node. 
Therefore, a sensor node eavesdrops on the information is being communicated to its 
neighboring sensor nodes. Sinkhole attacks ordinarily function by establishing a 
compromised node that seems attractive to surround the nodes with regard to the 
routing metric. For instance, the attacker could spoof or reply to an advertisement for a 
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very high quality route to the base station [2]. Karlof and Wagner noted that the sensor 
nodes are vulnerable to the sinkhole attack based on the communication design. Some 
security attacks, such as selective forwarding or eavesdropping, can be started during a 
sinkhole attack. The malicious node or even the attacker can do anything in the network 
as long as the data are routed through the malicious node. WSNs are vulnerable to 
sinkhole attacks because many nodes transfer data to a single base station [26]. A 
sinkhole attack is always searching for nodes located near the base station. 
2.5.3. Sybil Attack 
The Sybil attack is defined as a malicious device that assumes numerous 
identities [27]. Malicious nodes can allege to have many identities. WSNs are 
vulnerable to the Sybil attack. In this a case, a node can act as more than one node using 
different identities of legitimate nodes. Therefore, a single node presents multiple 
identities to other nodes in the network [28]. The Sybil attack has attempted to degrade 
the integrity of data, security and resource utilization [7]. James et al. [29] developed a 
classification for the Sybil attack. They presented direct vs. indirect communication, 
fabrication vs. stolen identities, and simultaneity as three dimensions. They proposed 
defenses against the Sybil attack in sensor network, including radio resource testing, 
verification of key sets for random key pre-distribution, and registration and position 
verification. 
2.5.4. Wormhole Attack 
This type of attack is an important and also it is a dangerous attack. The attacker 
could record a packet at a single location in the network, tunnels them to another 
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location, and resends them into the network [2]. The attacker can replay messages to 
any part of the network. In wormhole attacks, malicious nodes can create a hidden 
channel between sensor nodes [30]. A wormhole attack is an important threat to a 
wireless sensor network because this type of attack does not require that a sensor in the 
network be compromised. This type of attack affects the network layer by continuously 
hearing and recording data [31]. It can be implemented in the initial phase when the 
sensor launches to discover information. 
A wormhole attack is not easy to detect because an attacker uses a private band, 
of which the network is not aware [2]. The technique for detecting a wormhole attack 
was proposed by Perrig et al. [31]. It is based on packet leashes, and a message includes 
a timestamp and the location of the sender. However, it requires strict time 
synchronization and is infeasible for most sensor networks. Wormhole and sinkhole 
attacks are sometimes combined to attack the sensor networks. These two types of 
attacks render the networks hard to defend against attacks [2]. 
2.5.5. HELLO Flood Attack 
The attackers in HELLO flood attacks send or replay a routing protocol [2]. This 
protocol consists of HELLO packets, which transmit between sensor nodes with extra 
energy. HELLO packets are employed as a weapon to encourage the sensors in WSNs. 
The victim nodes attempt to go through the attacker because they think that the attacker 
is their neighbor [2]. 
In this chapter, the discussion of countermeasure for selective forwarding 
attacks is the main goal of this survey. The denial of service attack creates assortments 
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to attack wireless sensor networks. These assortments may temper sensor nodes and the 
function of networks. Consequently, some attackers target layers, such as the physical 
layer, the network layer, the link layer, and the transport layer, and some attackers target 
the routing layer. A DoS attack may occur in any layer of an OSI layer. All DoS attacks 
are dependent on the vulnerability of each layer in the architecture of wireless sensor 
networks. In a DoS attack, adversaries attempt to decipher a system but are 
unsuccessful. The selective forwarding attack is such an attack. 
A selective forwarding attack is hard to detect due to unreliable sensor wireless 
communications. Karlof and Wagner [2] discussed the selective forwarding attack. In 
this type of attack, malicious nodes have attempted to stop the packets in a network by 
rejecting or refusing certain message forwarding and drop them [32]. According to [2], 
selective forwarding attacks can impact some multi-hop routing protocols, such as 
TinyOS beaconing, DSR, PSFQ, directed diffusion and its multipath variant, and 
geographic routing (GPSR and GEAR). During the launch of a selective forwarding 
attack, a compromised node has notable consequences, including itself, along the path 
of data. Based on previous studies, this type of attack makes the sensor network rely on 
the redundancy forwarding via broadcast for data to spread during the network.  
Karlof et al. [2] suggested the prevention of selective forwarding attacks by 
counting the selective forwarding attacks using multipath routing between nodes, which 
has disadvantages. Communication overhead is increasing, which causes an increase in 
the number of paths. In addition, the security of WSNs cannot be resilient. The 
malicious node forwards several packets to the neighbors but drops some them, which 
causes a significant loss of data. The Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy 
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(LEACH) protocol, which was improved by Wu, Hu, and Ni to the SS-LEACH 
algorithm, can prevent a selective forwarding attack using a sequence number. Thus, the 
cluster head is responsible for sending a packet. Jeremy Brown et al [33] described a 
centralized cluster based a new approach for detecting selective forwarding attack by 
applying Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) method [34] [35]. 
2.6. Selective Forwarding Detection Techniques  
2.6.1. Selective Forwarding Scheme using Multi-Hop LWSS 
Xin et. al., [36] proposed a lightweight defense against a selective forwarding 
attack. This defense is dependent on the neighboring nodes. Thus, neighboring nodes 
monitor the packets during packet transmission, assess the attacker’s location and 
retransfer the packets dropped by the attackers. As a result, they suggested that this 
approach consumes less energy and storage. Its efficiency in detecting selective 
forwarding attacks ensures packet delivery to the base station. The defense scheme 
employs a hexagonal WSN mesh topology. According to the hexagonal mesh topology, 
the authors specified some processes of topology construction, such as node 
initialization, cell partition, active node election, and secure architecture construction. In 
node initialization, the node determines its location and its neighbors’ locations. In cell 
partition, the node determines the association with the RC as shown in Figure 3. Active 
node selection involves contact with nodes of other RCs. The communication relation is 
determined between RCs to establish and construct a secure architecture. 
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Figure 3: An example for the monitor node gets the attacker-Redrawn [36] 
 
Xin, et.al. Discussed the two phases of a defense scheme. The first phase is 
routing discovery and selection. The second phase is data transmission with attack 
defense. Based on the network model, routing discovery and selection method are 
designed to prevent selective forwarding attacks. It calculates the number of hops 
between the source node and the destination node. According to the policy of the 
probability, it selects the transmission route. A method is employed to randomly create 
the number of continuous hops. In the discovery process, they obtain routes with a 
specific number of hops in each direction via probability schemes. In data transmission, 
a packet is sent via a source node using a selected process after an event is produced. 
The source node transfers the event packet to the subsequent hop node. The next hop 
node, which is referred to as the intermediate node, receives the event packet and 
neighboring node, which is referred to as the monitor node. The monitor node, which is 
the neighboring node responsible for detecting the possibility of a selective forwarding 
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attack, resends the event packet to the destination node and sends an alarm message to 
its neighboring nodes for the location attacker. 
Yu and Xiao [37] proposed an approach based on lightweight security to detect 
a selective forwarding attack in the environment of sensor networks. The approach 
utilized a multi-hop acknowledgment to launch alarms by obtaining responses from the 
nodes that are located in the middle of paths. Authors assumed the approach could 
identify malicious sensor nodes. The aim of the detection attack is to send an alarm 
when a malicious node is discovered, which indicates a selective forwarding attack. Yu 
and Xiao employed two detection processes in the scheme: a downstream process (the 
direction on the way to the base station) and an upstream process (the direction on the 
way to the source node). In the upstream process, a report packet is created and sent to 
the base station hop by hop when nodes detect a malicious node. ACK_Cnt is set to 
ACK_Span, which is a predefined metric. The node that is referred to as the 
intermediate node saves the packet report as soon as it is received in its cache decreases 
the ACK_Cnt by one or resets ACK_Cnt to its initial value. The packet report may be 
sent downstream if ACK_Cnt is 0. Simultaneously, an ACK packet is created and the 
TTL in the ACK packet is set to ACK_TTL, which is a predefined metric. In the 
remaining detection process, which occurs downstream, packet loss may occur if the 
intermediate node receives a report packet that should have Packet_ID for a certain 
source node. In this case, the node creates an alarm packet, in which 
Lost_Packet_ID_Beg and Lost_Packet_ID_End describe the range of the lost 
Packet_IDs, and Suspicious_Node_ID is set to the upstream node, where the report with 
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the discontinuous Packet_ID originated. The base station will receive the alarm packet 
and forward multiple hops that are produced by the node. 
LWSS detection accuracy is increased by a detecting selective forwarding attack 
scheme. Although the radio frequency status is poor, detection accuracy is guaranteed. 
The scheme authorizes the base station and source nodes to collect attack alarm 
information from the intermediate nodes. Because the sensor node requires more effort, 
it will impact the efficiency of scheme. The scheme cannot develop a countermeasure 
for other types of attacks; thus, the scalability will be decreased. 
	
Figure 4: Suspect nodes Identification-Redrawn [37] 
 
The identification of suspect nodes is reported via an intermediate node. Figure 
4 provides an example of a node that is suspect and detected by an intermediate node. 
First, Xiao, Yu, and GAO [37] proposed a checkpoint-based method. In this approach, a 
node is randomly selected as the checkpoint to send an acknowledgement message for 
detecting the adversary. It is a mechanism used to identify suspect nodes in a selective 
forwarding attack. They have attempted to improve the technique by detecting an 
abnormal packet in sensor networks [36]. They assumed that any compromised nodes 
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could not create alert packets with the aim of maliciously prosecuting other nodes. In 
the previous example, node µ3 produced an alert packet to prosecute node µ4. Thus, the 
prosecuted node is a compromised node. After collecting evidence to determine whether 
the node is a malicious node, the source nodes determine the position of the suspect 
node according to the location. However, it is no guarantee for reliable transmission of 
messages even though the adversary is positioned by acknowledgement.  
The identification of suspect nodes is reported via an intermediate node. First, 
Xiao, Yu, and GAO [37] proposed a checkpoint-based method. Figure 5 illustrates the 
node is randomly selected as the checkpoint to send an acknowledgement message for 
detecting the adversary. It is a mechanism used to identify suspect nodes in a selective 
forwarding attack. They have attempted to improve the technique by detecting an 
abnormal packet in sensor networks. They assumed that any compromised nodes could 
not create alert packets with the aim of maliciously prosecuting other nodes. After 
collecting evidence to determine whether the node is a malicious node, the source nodes 
determine the position of the suspect node according to the location. However, it is no 
guarantee for reliable transmission of messages even though the adversary is positioned 
by acknowledgement. 
	
Figure 5: An example of multi-hop acknowledgement with ACK_Span=3, ACK_TTL=6. -Redrawn [37] 
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LWSS Drawbacks: 
• Resend the packet by using another route caused energy 
consumption and delay during the detection. 
• Transmission of the acknowledgement packet and one-way key 
packet are also caused energy consumed.  
• The scheme is lack of scalability. 
• The scheme spent much effort to detect the attack thus it is lack of 
efficiency.  
• LWSS scheme could not detect the attack in some certain 
conditions. 
• Sending the acknowledgment caused wasted the energy.  
There is no commitment for the reliable if the packet is dropped. 
2.6.2. Selective Forwarding Scheme using Two-Hop LWD 
Tran Hoang and Eui-Nam [38] proposed an approach against selective 
forwarding attacks that consists of a lightweight detection mechanism. The detection is 
a centralized cluster, which utilized the two-hop neighborhood node information and 
overhearing technique. It is dependent on the broadcast nature of sensor communication 
and the high density of sensors. Each sensor node is provided with a detection module 
that is constructed on an application layer. Sensor node sets routing rules and two-hop 
neighbor knowledge to generate an alert packet. Hoang and Nam suggested that the two 
routing rules make the monitoring system more suitable. Thus, the first rule is to 
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determine if the destination node forwards the packet along the path to the sink. It 
generates an alert packet with the malicious factor a to the sender/source node. The 
second rule governs that the monitor node waits and detects the packet that was already 
forwarded along the path to the sink. It verifies the two-hop neighbor knowledge to 
assess whether the destination node is on the right path to the sink. If not, it generates an 
alert packet with the malicious factor b to the sender/source node. 
The detection module is responsible for passively detecting a selective 
forwarding attack in its neighboring sensor node. The malicious counter is defined as 
the threshold of abnormal activity in a sensor node, which could not skip. Figure 6 
provides the malicious counter crossed the threshold X, it revoked the malicious node 
from its neighbor list. The authors have assumed that the neighboring node should be 
recognized. The neighboring node must be secure and confidential in the deployment 
time. The network has a static topology and uses key management to prevent any 
outside attacks. The selection of one type of network topology prevents the scheme 
from working with other topologies. Some types of topology such as mesh topology 
could be protected by using cryptography solutions in selective forwarding attack [39]. 
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Figure 6: Illustration of monitor node-Redrawn [38] 
 
LWD Drawbacks: 
• The network has a static topology. Therefore, LWD scheme will 
not detect the attack if change the type of topology. 
• There is no guarantee for the reliable. 
• Detection scheme is not work if node is compromised. 
2.6.3. Selective Forwarding Scheme using Watermark Technique SDT 
Huijuan Deng et al, [40] proposed a scheme for secure data transmission and 
detecting a selective forwarding attack. They used watermark technology to detect 
malicious nodes. Prior to employing a watermark technique, they used a trust value to 
determine a source path for message forwarding. The trust value involves weighting the 
credit of each sensor node. The author notes an error rate of 10% and detection accuracy 
over than 90%. They assumed that the base station is always trustworthy and cannot be 
comprised by the adversary, which renders the scheme inappropriate for real wireless 
sensor networks. Every node has a trust value. At the beginning of network initializing, 
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all nodes should have the same trust value. Huijuan Deng et al. utilized the watermark 
technique to calculate the packet loss. Data transmission begins when an optimal 
routing path is confirmed. The base station creates a k bits binary sequence as the 
original watermark message. Therefore, a watermark message is part of the packets. A 
base station compares the extract watermark to the original watermark to detect a 
selective forwarding attack. The simulation results reveal a channel error rate of 10% 
and detection accuracy greater than 90%. 
 
SDT Drawbacks: 
• There is no data resend method if the packet is dropped. 
• SDT scheme cannot detect the malicious node if more than two. 
• The scheme is not convenient for sensor caused malicious node 
and BS cannot compromise. 
2.6.4. Selective Forwarding Scheme using Extra Monitor RSSI-EM 
Chanatip et al. [41] have proposed a lightweight scheme. They referred to it as a 
traffic monitor-based selective forwarding attack detection scheme. They used Extra 
Monitor (EM) to eavesdrop and monitor all traffic when transferring data between 
nodes. They also employed RSSI to detect a sinkhole attack. The value of RSSI is that 
four EM nodes can be arranged to establish the positions of all sensor nodes, of which 
the base station position should be (0, 0). Chanatip et al. have assumed that the network 
is static when sensor nodes are deployed; thus, any change in the type of topology will 
immediately affect their approach. They assumed that the attackers could capture and 
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damage the nodes. Therefore, all sensor nodes must protect or use tamper robust 
hardware. These assumptions have caused the detection scheme to drain the energy of 
the sensor nodes and contribute to the high cost. 
RSSI-EM Drawbacks: 
• The topology is static thus any change of it will effect to the 
efficiency of the scheme. 
• The accuracy of scheme is low. 
2.7. Selective Forwarding Detection Evaluation  
We further evaluate the performance of these approaches through simulations. 
We simulate a sensor network with size 800 * 800 square meters in which 200 sensor 
nodes are deployed. Hence, each node has a 35 meters transmission range and sensing 
range of node is 30 meters. In the simulation, we pointed on energy consumption, 
average throughput, reliable detection rate, and scalability ratio. Details of the rules are 
given in Table 5. 
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Figure 7: Energy consumption 
 
Energy is an important factor. Figure 7 shows the performance of energy 
consumption for LWSS, LWD, SDT, and RSSI-EM approaches. The node cost is about 
5J energy with 180 static nodes and 20 mobility nodes. As a result, we saw different 
percentage energy consumption for each one of these approaches. They consumed 
75.1%, 81.8%, 69.1%, and 68.5% respectively. Thus, the total of malicious nodes and 
energy consumption are appearing. 
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Figure 8: Average throughput 
 
In Figure 8, the graph shows the average throughput of approaches during the 
attacks without mobility. The malicious node is 50%, malicious mobile node is 0%, and 
malicious static node is 100%. Therefore, average for each approach is 293k b/sec, 
292.9k b/sec, 278.1k b/sec, and 292.8k b/sec respectively. 
	
Figure 9: Reliable detection rate 
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As shown in Figure 9, the reliable detection rate for LWSS, LWD, SDT, and 
RSSI-EM approaches are not stable and go down when the time increased. The reliable 
rate are 88.2%, 90.6%, 89.6%, and 86.3% respectively. 
	
Figure 10: Scalability ratio 
 
Figure 10 shows the scalability ratio for LWSS, LWD, SDT, and RSSI-EM 
approaches is not stable. 
Table 1: Selective Forwarding Attack Analysis 
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Table 2: Selective Forwarding Attack Detection Analysis 
 
	
Table 3: Selective Forwarding Attack Detection Approaches Comparison 
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Table 4: Detection Approaches Analysis 
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CHAPTER 3: MULTI LAYER APPROACH FOR 
DETECTION OF SELECTIVE FORWARDING ATTACKS 
Security issues in wireless sensor networks are critical. Therefore, components 
that are designed without security can easily become an area for attack. In recent years, 
the security of WSNs has become increasingly concerning. Sensor node has limited 
communication and computational resources. It has a short radio range, and simply 
compromised by an attacker. In a selective forwarding attack, malicious nodes may 
refuse to forward specific messages and simply drop them or forward the message to the 
wrong path. Moreover, another variance of this type of attack is to delay packets 
passing through nodes, breaks the link between nodes, steals some sensitive information 
of packet. As a result, the entire packet is not transferred to the base station. The 
selective forwarding attack is smart attack. However, it can be detect by using multi-
layer detection approach [42]. 
We design multi-layer framework based on IDS to detect selective forwarding 
attacks as well as provides surveillance for military base. The approach contains: 
• MAC pool IDs layer.  
• Rule-based processing layer. 
• Anomaly detection layer. 
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The goal of our approach is to detect the malicious node, extend the network life 
time, maintaining the Quality of Service (QoS), and military base surveillance. The 
distributed approach, on the other hand, have the advantage of improved detection 
accuracy, low false alarm rates and also if the cluster head gets compromised or the 
base station gets surrounded by the malicious nodes, the other sensor nodes within the 
network can still detect the attack and isolate the malicious node. We assume that once 
the network initializes, the adversaries are not attack the network for the first period. 
3.1. Selective Forwarding Detection (SFD) using Multi-Layer 
Rule-based IDS is also known as signature-based IDS, which is one of the 
mechanisms for protecting a network from security threats. The network layer in WSNs 
is threatened with many types of attacks, including wormhole and sinkhole attacks. Our 
proposal focuses on the selective forwarding attack. As shown in Figure 11, we design a 
multi-layer approach to detect one type of security attack, which is selective forwarding 
attack that includes the three security layers. The first layer is a pool of MAC IDs. In 
this layer, the important information is filtered and stored. The information includes 
message fields (e.g., packet, destination, and source IDs) that are useful for rule-based 
processing. The second layer is the rule-based processing layer. In this layer, there are 
some rules that must be applied to the stored data. Incoming traffic is either accepted or 
rejected. In addition, no rules are applied to a message that fails. The third layer is the 
anomaly detection layer, which detects the false negative anomalies that comprise 
unknown attacks. The second layer (rule-based processing) and the third layer (anomaly 
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detection-based IDS) can identify and control selective forwarding attacks in all phases. 
The three layers are shown in Figure 12. They are supported with three algorithms. 
 
	
Figure 11: Multi-Layer Approach 
 
The algorithms are used to resolve the attack on the network. An efficient 
algorithms appropriate for WSNs environment is required to secure communications 
between nodes. The detection approach saves energy by using little time and memory. It 
chooses a secure route along which to transfer data between the source and base station. 
Furthermore, SFD approach will be reliable, energy efficient, and scalable. All of these 
factors are important for networks of sensor nodes. Additionally, this approach has 
highly accuracy rate. We compared our approach with other approaches and found SFD 
has 98.3% accuracy rate so it is higher than other approaches [43]. 
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Figure 12: Selective Forwarding Detection (SFD) Flowchart 
 
3.1.1. MAC Pool IDs Layer 
The first layer consists of a pool of MAC IDs that filter and match the traffic. 
Each traffic packet is monitored. The packet is matched to identify malicious activity 
using message fields (e.g., the packet, destination, and source IDs). It checks whether a 
node is legitimate or malicious. Therefore, if a node is assigned a value of zero, it drops 
a packet and is considered malicious. Otherwise, it is accepted as a legitimate node and 
send it to the second layer, which is rule processing layer. In our study, we analyze the 
malicious nodes that are detected in the first step using an algorithm based on the pool 
of MAC IDs as shown in Algorithm 1. 
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Algorithm 1. MAC Pool of IDs Layer 
1. Input = (MP: Mac Pool) 
2. Network parameter = (SN: sensor node, RT: route, TSN: Total sensor node) 
3. For (SN = 0; SN <= TSN; SN++) 
4.            Set SN = SN + 1 
5.       If SN Î MP then 
6.            Set SN = 0 // the node is declared as malicious node not allowed for 
communication. 
7.                Rejected 
8.                Dropped 
9.       Else if SN = 1 // Node is declared as a legitimate node and allowed for 
communication 
10.                Accept 
11.                Store 
12.             Set SN = RT 
13.                SN ® RP 
14.       End if  
15.       End else 
16. End for 
 
3.1.2. Rules Processing Layer 
The second layer involves rule-based processing. It is the middle layer. It detects 
known attacks using rules. These are techniques used to define and describe the normal 
operations for detecting selective forwarding attacks. Rules must be applied before 
nodes are deployed in a network area. The rule-based processing layer checks the traffic 
by comparing it to a list of rules. If the traffic satisfies at least 90% of the rules, the 
node is confirmed to be legitimate as shown in Algorithm 2. Therefore, the traffic will 
be accepted and send it to the third layer, which is anomaly detection layer. If the traffic 
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does not satisfy 90% of the rules, the node is considered doubtful and is rejected. 
Details of the rules are given in Table 5. 
Algorithm	2.	Rules	Processing	Layer	
1. Input = (RP: Rules Process) 
2. Output = (DT: Selective Forwarding Detector, RU: Rules) 
3. Network parameter = (SN: Sensor node, RT: Route) 
4. Attacking parameter = (SFAT: Attacker) 
5. RL1 = Rules based in IDS (RL1IDS) 
6. RP Í RL1IDS 
7.            Set RL1 >= RU // 90% from the rules 
8. For (SFAT = RL1; SFAT <= RP; SFAT ++) 
9.       If SFAT Í RP then 
10.               DT ® SFAT 
11.              Attack alert 
12.              Rejected 
13.              Dropped 
14. Else if (SFAT Ë RP) then 
15.            Set SN = RT 
16.               SN ® AD 
17.       End if 
18.       End else 
19. End for 
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Table 5: Rules Processing 
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Anomaly Detection Layer Based on Intrusion Detection System 
The third layer involves anomaly detection, which is the recognition of unknown 
attacks. This layer checks the traffic that comes from the rule-based processing layer. 
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Therefore, it works to analyze the traffic. The possible results of anomaly detection are 
false negative, false positive, true negative, and true positive. If the algorithm 
determines that an unknown attack, which is a false negative, it sends an alert that is a 
malicious node thus it dropped. Otherwise, the traffic is returned to the pool of MAC 
IDs by confirming the legitimacy of the node as shown in Algorithm 3. Figure 13 shows 
all three layers. 
Algorithm 3. Anomaly Detection Layer Based on IDS 
1. Input = (AD: Anomaly Detection) 
2. Output = (DT: Selective Forwarding Detector) 
3. Network parameter = (SN: Sensor node, RT: Route) 
4. Attacking parameter = (SFAT: Attacker) 
5. RL2 = Anomaly detection based in IDS (RL2IDS) 
6. AD Í RL2IDS 
7. For (RL2 = 0; RL2 <= AD; RL2 ++) 
8.            RL2 = RL2 + 1 
9.       If RL2 Î AD then 
10.            Compute FN 
11.               FN = 1/N ∑ FN 
12.                    M = 1 
13.             Set Alert 
14.                Rejected 
15.                Dropped 
16.       Else if RL2 Ï AD then 
17.             No Attack 
18.             Set SN = RT 
19.                Return 
20.                SN ® MP 
21.                Declared 
22.       End if 
23.       End else 
24. End for 
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Figure 13: Selective Forwarding Detection-SFD Multi-Layers 
 
3.2. Reliable, Energy efficient and Scalable (RES) Model 
The goal of reliable energy-efficient and scalable (RES) model is to extend the 
network life time while maintaining the Quality of Service (QoS). The network lifetime 
is the most significant metrics of wireless sensor networks. RES also aims to balance 
the energy utilization for unevenly distributed sensor nodes to provide longer secure 
surveillance for military base. In the military base surveillance, there is high probability 
of nodes to die by forwarding heavy traffic [43, 44]. 
3.2.1. Reliable 
In order to develop the reliable communication, we have to determine the 
reliable path from the sender node to the base station, as the ′∀K′ number of the sensor 
nodes in the reliable optimal ′RP′  path is given as 
𝑅𝑃()∀*(+, 																																																																																																																																									(1) 
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Let us assume that WSNs are perceived as the 2D graph with vertex ′V′ and 
edges ′E′ written as G(V, E) with transmission range ′T6′ so that the maximum reliable 
communication can be obtained using Bellman-Ford algorithm’s link measurement 
properties ′BF′ given as: 
𝐵𝐹 = 𝜃𝜎>?𝑇A𝑑CDE 																																																																																																																																			(2) 
Once, we start searching the reliable path for communication then we can write 
as: 
𝑅𝑃 ∶ 𝑅𝑃HIC 	 𝑅𝑃()J((,)) 	− 	𝑅𝑃H(E 			 −𝑙𝑜𝑔 1𝑅𝑃()
J
((,)∈PQ) 																																																																							(3) 
We apply Rayleigh fading model to confirm the reliable communication as: 
𝑅𝑃 ∶ 𝑅𝑃H(E 			 −𝑙𝑜𝑔 1𝑅𝑃()J((,)∈PQ) 	− 𝑅𝑃H(E −𝑙𝑜𝑔?
J
(,)∈PQ 	− 𝐵𝐹 − (−𝐵𝐹)
J
((,)∈PQ) 		 
Substituting the BF, we get as 
𝑅𝑃 ∶ 𝑅𝑃H(E 			 −𝑙𝑜𝑔 1𝑅𝑃()J((,)∈PQ) 	− 𝑅𝑃H(E −𝑙𝑜𝑔?
J
(,)∈PQ 	− 𝜃𝜎>?𝑇A𝑑CDE − − 𝜃𝜎>?𝑇A𝑑CDE
J
(,)∈PQ 				(4)		 
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Figure 14: Reliable Detection Rate of SFD Approach 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the rate of reliable detecting of selective forwarding attacks. 
The proposed approach to SFD has a perfect detection rate. This rate is greater than 
98%; therefore, it is easier to detect malicious nodes when they dropped packets. 
3.2.2. Energy efficient 
Once we are able to find the reliable communication, then we have to balance 
the energy consumption. Thus, the RES also aims to balance the energy utilization for 
unevenly distributed sensor nodes to provide longer secure surveillance for military 
base. In the military base surveillance, there is highest probability of nodes to die by 
forwarding heavy traffic.  
We defined the network lifetime when the sensor node first time drains its 
energy. Ideally, prolonging the network lifetime requires to satisfy the following 
conditions: 
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• Total consumed energy for all sensor nodes in the network. 
• Determine the differences between the node’s individual energy consumption, 
average energy consumption of each sensor node, and energy consumed for 
transmitting the packet and for receiving the packet. 
 
Total consumed energy for all sensor nodes in the network should be considered 
as minimal′ ∆𝐸H ′. The differences between the node’s individual energy 
consumption∆𝐸H(1 ≤ 𝑘	 ≤ 	 𝑆E) and an average energy consumption ′∆𝐸I′ is the minimal 
energy.  The differences can be accumulated as: 
𝜌? = 𝑘EZ+, ∆𝐸H −	∆𝐸I ?																																																																																																							(5) 
 
where ′ρ?′ is differences between minimal energy and an average energy of the 
sensor node. 
After determining the differences, we focuses on an average energy ∆E] 
consumption of each sensor node that can be written as: 
∆𝐸I = 	 𝑘(∆𝐸H)EZ+, 																																																																																																																																					(6) 
Once, an average energy ∆E]  consumption is determined; then we substitute the 
minimal energy consumption ∆E_ of each sensor node 
∆𝐸H = 						 ∆𝛽a 	 𝑌cZEc∈d(Z) 	+ ∆𝛾A 	 𝑍hZ
E
h	∈	d(Z) 																					 
	
	
45	
∆𝐸I = 	 𝑘EZ+, 	 ∆𝛽a 	 𝑌cZ
E
c∈d(Z) 		
+ ∆𝛾A 	 𝑍hZEh	∈	d(Z) 				 																																																																																																		(7)									 
where  ′∆𝛽a′  is energy consumed for transmitting the packet & ′∆𝛾A′  energy 
consumed for receiving the packet. 
As well as, we need to determine the number of generated packets generated by 
sensor node′𝑘′. 
𝜔k = 		 ∆𝛽a 	 𝑌cZEc∈d(Z)
− ∆𝛾A 	 𝑍hZEh	∈	d(Z) 				 																																																																																																									(8)								 
Based on minimal energy consumption and generated packets, the total 
consumed energy ∆TE_ can be determined as follows: 
 
∆𝑇𝐸H = 	 𝑘EZ+, 	 ∆𝛽a 	 𝑌cZ
E
c∈d(Z) 	+ ∆𝛾A 	 𝑍hZ
E
h	∈	d(Z) 				 		
×	 ∆𝛽a 	 𝑌cZEc∈d(Z) − ∆𝛾A 	 𝑍hZ
E
h	∈	d(Z) 				 													(9) 
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Figure 15: Energy Consumption of SFD Approach 
 
We calculated the amount of energy consumed. Figure 15 is shown the energy 
consumption of our approach to SFD when 10% of the nodes were malicious and 10% 
were mobile. The network consumed less energy when it included mobile nodes; 
therefore, it was 60.4% at the highest point, and the energy cost was low. Therefore, if 
there are malicious nodes along the routes, this approach to SFD costed less in terms of 
communication overhead. 
3.2.3. Scalable 
Sensor network routing protocols should be scalable enough to respond to 
events in the environment as shown in Figure 16. Once a node joins and leaves the 
network, the communication performance is affected and the QoS provisioning is 
degraded. We address scalability in our design to overcome the performance 
degradation. 
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Let us consider the number of joining nodes ′kpqin the network. Size of the 
network is limited and it does not accept the load more thankp ≤ 1	 ≤ 	 kr	. Given that 
the network will accept ′ks′ sensor nodes in the network. Thus, scalable probability of 
network can be defined as: 
𝑆kt = (𝑘a) + 𝑘)∝Z+, ×	 (∆𝑝)EJt(+,	&	)+, 	+ (∇p)																																																																														(10) 
 
Where ′(∆p){′ the number of delivered packets from the sensor nodes that are 
already part of the network and ′∇p′  the number of packets delivered by joining nodes 
in the network and ′S}t′ scalable probability when sensor nodes join the networks. 
Once, the sensor node wants to leave the network, then we can determine the 
scalable probability of network as 
𝑆kD = (𝑘a) − 𝑘)∝Z+, ×	 (∆𝑝)EJt(+,	&	)+, − (∇p)																																																(11) 
 
Where ′S}D′   scalable probability when sensor nodes leave the networks. 
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Figure 16: Scalability Ratio of SFD Approach 
 
Based on this model, we can extend the network lifetime even malicious nodes 
intend to exploit the network. SFD approach designed to execute some problems in 
sensor network field such as detection selective forwarding attacks, increasing reliable 
detection rate, energy efficient, and scalable enough to respond to events in the 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 4: SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS  
4.1. Simulation Setup 
The simulation scenario consists of 200 nodes with a transmission range of 35 
meters and sensing range of 30 meters. The 200 nodes divided into 120 as a legitimate 
sensor nodes and 80 as malicious sensor nodes. (There are 180 static and 20 mobile 
nodes). The nodes are randomly placed in uniform fashion in the area of 800 * 800 m2 
using NS2. The initial energy of the nodes is set 5 joules. The bandwidth of the node is 
60 kb/sec, and maximum power consumption for each sensor is set 15.2 mW. Sensing 
and idle modes have 11.8 mW. Each sensor is capable of broadcasting the data at power 
intensity ranging from -18 dBm to 13 dBm Table 6 [45, 46]. 
Table 6: Simulation Setup 
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4.2. Reliable Detection 
Figure 17 describes the reliable detection rate of our approach and other works. 
The reliable detection is an important to extend the network life time. We proved 
number of packet successfully implemented at the destination node. It cleared that SFD 
is stabled almost at the same level when the time increased from 0 minutes to 27 
minutes. 
	
Figure 17: Reliable Detection Rate of Selective Forwarding Attack 
 
The reliable detection rate is 98.4%. The reliable detection rate of SDT, RSSI-
ME, LWSS, and LWD approaches are not stable and go down when the time increased. 
The reliable rates are 89.6%, 86.3%, 88.2%, and 90.6% respectively. 
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4.3. Energy Efficient 
Energy is an important factor. Figure 18 shows the energy consumption of our 
approach and SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD approaches with 200 static nodes and 
no mobility nodes.	
	
Figure 18: Energy Consumption of Selective Forwarding Attack (No Mobility Node) 
 
Energy consumption at 10% malicious nodes. They consumed 69.1%, 68.5%, 
76%, and 76% respectively. SFD is 60.4% at the highest point, and the energy cost is 
low. It is more efficient while node’s detection is increased. Therefore, if there are 
malicious nodes along the routes, SFD approach able to reduce the less of 
communication overhead. 
 
Figure 19 shows the performance of energy consumption SDT, RSSI-EM, 
LWSS, and LWD approaches with 180 static nodes and 20 mobility nodes. In 
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comparing SFD approach with other approaches, we assume the 10% of nodes are 
malicious. 
 
 
Figure 19: Energy Consumption of Selective Forwarding Attack (20% Mobility Node) 
 
As a result, we found various percentage energy consumption for each one of all 
approaches. They consumed 69%, 68%, 76%, and 76% respectively. Our approach 
consumed 60% at the highest point. Hence, the energy cost is low and It is more 
efficient while node’s detection is increased. Therefore, if there are malicious nodes 
along the routes, SFD approach able to reduce the less of communication overhead. 
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Figure 20 describes the rendering of energy consumption for SDT, RSSI-EM, 
LWSS, and LWD approaches with 160 static nodes and 40 mobility nodes. In 
comparing our approach with other approaches, we assume the 20% of nodes are 
malicious. Consequently, there were an energy consumption for each one of 
approaches. 
 
 
Figure 20: Energy Consumption of Selective Forwarding Attack 
 
They consumed 84%, 86%, 87%, and 87% respectively. SFD approach 
consumed 76% at the highest point. as a consequence of this comparing, the energy cost 
is low and It is more efficient while node’s detection is increased. Thus, SFD approach 
qualified for reducing the communication overhead. 
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Figure 21 shows the energy consumption of our approach and SDT, RSSI-EM, 
LWSS, and LWD approaches with 100 static nodes and 100 mobility nodes. We 
suppose the 10% nodes are malicious during the comparing between our approach and 
other approaches. 
 
	
Figure 21: Energy Consumption of Selective Forwarding Attack 
 
They consumed 83%, 83.2%, 84%, 85.1% respectively. SFD consumed 70%. 
Therefore, it is more efficient than other approaches. Hence, SFD approach has the 
ability to reduce the less of communication overhead even 50% static nodes and 50% 
mobility nodes. 
Figure 22 shows the energy consumption of our approach and SDT, RSSI-EM, 
LWSS, and LWD approaches with 50% static nodes and 50% mobility nodes. Energy 
consumption at 50% malicious nodes. 
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Figure 22: Energy Consumption of Selective Forwarding Attack 
 
They consumed 98%, 98.4%, 99.1%, 99.4%, and respectively. SFD is 89.1% at 
the highest point. Therefore, SFD approach able to reduce the less of communication 
overhead even the malicious node is 50% of network. 
4.4. Scalability Ratio 
Figure 23 shows the scalability ratio of all approaches with 200 sensor nodes 
including 10% mobile nodes and 10% malicious nodes. 
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Figure 23: Scalability Ratio (10% Malicious Node) 
 
The average of the scalability of all approaches after 12 minutes shows SFD 
approach is 97% and other approaches SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 93%, 
90%, 96%, and 94% respectively. At 27 minutes shows SFD is 97.8 and other 
approaches are 90%, 88%, 90.1%, and 95%. As a result, SFD approach is scalable 
during selective forwarding attack than other approaches. 
Figure 24 shows scalability ratio of all approaches with 200 sensor nodes 
including 10% mobile nodes and 25% malicious nodes. 
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Figure 24: Scalability Ratio (25% Malicious Node) 
 
The average of the scalability after 12 minutes, SFD approach is 97% and other 
approaches SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 88%, 87%, 96%, and 84% 
respectively. At 27 minutes, SFD is 96% and other approaches are 89.1%, 87%, 88%, 
and 96%. As a result of this, SFD approach is more scalable even under the attack. 
4.5. Probability 
Figure 25 shows the probability detection of selective forwarding attack and 
other competing approaches with 50% malicious nodes and 100% static nodes. 
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Figure 25: Probability Detection of Selective Forwarding Attack (No Mobility Node) 
 
As a result, SFD approach probability detection between 5 % and 25% 
malicious nodes is 98% however, the other approaches are between 87% and 90%. 
Therefore, the SFD approach in probability detection of selective forwarding attacks is 
higher than other approaches.  
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Figure 26: Probability Detection of Selective Forwarding Attack (25% Mobility Node) 
 
Figure 26 shows the probability detection of selective forwarding attack and 
other competing approaches with 50% malicious nodes and 25% mobility nodes. 
Hence, SFD approach probability detection between 5 % and 25% malicious nodes is 
95% however, the other approaches are between 83% and 86%. For this reason, the 
SFD approach in probability detection of selective forwarding attacks is higher than 
other approaches.  
Figure 27 shows the probability detection of selective forwarding attack and 
other competing approaches with 50% malicious nodes and 50% mobility nodes. 
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Figure 27: Probability Detection of Selective Forwarding Attack (50% Mobility Node) 
 
As a consequence of this, SFD approach probability detection between 5 % and 
50% malicious nodes is 90% however, the other approaches are between 64% and 69%. 
Thus, the SFD approach in probability detection of selective forwarding attacks is 
higher than other approaches. We used the probability detection formula as: 
𝑃~ = 𝑒D𝑖!J+, 	× 1𝑁 + 𝑖 − 1 ! 𝑒DEC 		𝛽. 𝜇Jt(t	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4.6. Packet Delivery Ratio 
 
	
Figure 28: Packet Delivery Ratio (No Mobility Node) 
 
Figure 28 describes packet delivery ratio with 100% static nodes and 50% 
malicious nodes. Between 5% and 50% malicious nodes, the average of SFD approach 
is 99.2% higher than other approaches that are 93.4%, 94.1%, 94.3%, and 92.2% 
respectively. And even malicious nodes are increased, our approach is higher to deliver 
packets than other approaches. 
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Figure 29: Packet Delivery Ratio (50% Mobility Node) 
 
Figure 29 shows packet delivery ratio with 50% static nodes, 50% mobility 
nodes and 50% malicious nodes. Between 5% and 50% malicious nodes, the average of 
SFD approach is 94% and the other approaches are 80%, 82%, 86%, and 83% 
respectively. Thus, our approach is higher to deliver packets than other approaches even 
malicious nodes are increased. 
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4.7. Detection of Selective Forwarding Attack Average 
Figure 30 shows detection of selective forwarding attack with 200 static nodes 
including 25 malicious nodes and no mobility node. 
 
	
Figure 30: Detection of Selective Forwarding Attack (No Mobility Node) 
 
The average of attack detection after 12 minutes shows SFD approach is 97% 
SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 90%, 88%, 86%, and 90% respectively. At 27 
minutes shows SFD is 96% and other approaches are 81%, 78%, 79%, and 82%. Thus, 
SFD approach is better to detect the selective forwarding attack than other approaches. 
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Figure 31 describes detection of selective forwarding attack with 200 sensor 
nodes including 50% mobile nodes and 25% malicious nodes. 
 
	
Figure 31: Detection of Selective Forwarding Attack (25% Mobility Node) 
 
The average of attack detection after 12 minutes shows SFD approach is 90% 
and the other approaches SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 77%, 78%, 72%, and 
70% respectively. At 27 minutes shows SFD is 87% and other approaches are 57%, 
59%, 50%, and 60%. Therefore, SFD is more improved detection the attack than others. 
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4.8. Throughput Average 
Figure 32 shows the average throughput of our approach and other approaches 
with 50% static nodes, 50% mobile nodes, and 50% malicious nodes. 
 
	
Figure 32: Average Throughput 
 
SFD approach after 100 nodes is 320 kb/sec and others are under 320 kb/sec. At 
200 nodes, SFD approach is 300 kb/sec and other approaches SDT, LWSS, RSSI-EM, 
and LWD are 260 kb/sec, 255 kb/sec, 240 kb/sec, and 230 kb/sec respectively.  
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Figure 33 shows the average throughput of our approach and other approaches 
with 100% static nodes and 50% malicious nodes. 
 
	
Figure 33: Average Throughput 
 
SFD approach after 100 nodes is 340 kb/sec and other approaches are around 
320 kb/sec. At 200 sensor nodes, SFD approach is 310 kb/sec and other approaches 
SDT, LWSS, RSSI-EM, and LWD are 270 kb/sec, 260 kb/sec, 250 kb/sec, and 240 
kb/sec respectively. 
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4.9. Accuracy Rate 
	
Figure 34: Accuracy Rate 
 
Accuracy rate of SFD and other competing selective forwarding mechanisms are 
showed in Figure 34. So the accuracy of our approach is more than 98%. 
4.10. Time Delay 
Figure 35 shows average time delay in different event monitoring time with 50% 
malicious mobile nodes. 
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Figure 35: Time Delay 
After 10 minutes, the average time delay of SFD approach is 2400 milliseconds 
and other approaches SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 3000, 3400, 3800, and 
2800 respectively. At 20 minutes, the average time delay of SFD is 4000 milliseconds 
and other approaches SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 5000, 5500, 6000, and 
5400 milliseconds respectively. 
Figure 36 shows average time delay in different event monitoring time with 
100% static nodes. 
 
	
	
69	
	
Figure 36: Time Delay 
 
After 10 minutes, the average time delay of SFD approach is 2000 milliseconds 
and other approaches SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 2700, 3600, 4000, and 
2700 respectively. At 20 minutes, the average time delay of SFD is 3500 milliseconds 
and other approaches SDT, RSSI-EM, LWSS, and LWD are 4600, 5000, 5500, and 
5600 milliseconds respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation addresses the selective forwarding detection approach of 
network layer of wireless sensor networks. The contribution focuses on the network 
layer and provides a multi-layer framework for detection of selective forwarding 
attacks. We presented a new approach, which provides three multi-layer based on 
intrusion detection system. These multi-layer are MAC pool IDs layer, rules processing 
layer, and anomaly detection layer. Each one of these layers is supported by a different 
algorithm. Therefore, SFD detects malicious nodes that attempt to attack the network. 
In the first layer, we used an algorithm based on a pool of MAC IDs that authenticates 
incoming traffic to determine whether a node is legitimate or malicious. In the second 
layer, we used a rule-based processing algorithm, which checks the traffic by comparing 
it to a list of rules. In the third layer, we used an anomaly detection algorithm to identify 
unknown attacks, which appear as false negatives, send an alert, and reject the traffic. 
The approach goals are to preserve QoS of WSNs, reduce the energy waste, improve the 
reliable detection rate, and handle the scalability. The presented framework provides a 
new security model to detect the selective forwarding attacks, which validates the 
sensor node and then allows transfer of true information between nodes and the base 
station. 
The network’s lifetime is the most significant metrics of wireless sensor 
networks. Thus, we improved reliability detection, reduced the energy consumptions 
and developed scalability ratio. These factors aim to balance the energy utilization for 
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unevenly distributed sensor nodes and to provide longer secure surveillance for a 
military base while maintaining the Quality of Service (QoS). The remaining work for 
the dissertation is to show the effectiveness of our approach to detect the malicious 
nodes using in a mobile status. Also, we will show the performance of energy efficient 
and comparing with other approaches. 
We compared the SFD approach with other approaches including LWSS, LWD, 
SDT, and RSS-EM by using NS2. Therefore, the simulation results demonstrate that 
SFD approach performs higher throughput than other competing selective forwarding 
approaches with 50% malicious nodes and 50% mobile nodes. SFD approach obtains 
the average of throughput between 300 Kbits and 320 Kbits whereas the other 
approaches are between 220 Kbits and 300 Kbits. We assumed that the SFD approach 
can be a perfect detection approach of selective forwarding attacks for military 
application. 
This model is designed for detection of one type of attack in wireless sensor 
networks which is selective forwarding attack, but managing multi-layers to add 
features to detect some types of attacks in the same layer. 
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